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NOTES AND

COMMENT

Air Passage: European Ticket Exemption Clause
The extensive and intensive development in Europe of passenger
transportation through the air at a time now some years past when the
dangers inherently connected with such travel were considered greater
than they are considered today naturally brought about the insertion
into the contracts of transportation of an exemption clause to the effect
that the passenger by accepting air transportation waives for himself
and his legal representatives all claim for any damage or injury occurring
mediately or -immediately to himself, his personal effects and his baggage during or in connection with a flight. This or a similar provision
is found today in the tickets issued by most of the European air lines.
Some even exempt in express terms damages or injury occurring in connection with the automobile which takes passengers to and from the airport. That such an exemption must raise important legal issues is a
foregone conclusion.
In 1925 a plane lost its way from Stuttgart to Munich and was forced
down in Switzerland and a passenger was killed. The ticket contained
a stringent exemption clause. The Reichsgericht held that the clause
was ambiguous and would not be construed to exempt from damages
occurring through the misconduct of the pilot; that the word "danger"
occurring therein will be construed as referring to the general danger
from such a voyage which was considered greater in 1925 than in 1927;
and that as air navigation becomes more general so that the public will
be forced to use the planes even the general clause might not be upheld. (1927 L. v. Aero Lloyd A.G. and H 56 Juristiche Wochenschrift
2210, 117 Entscheidungen des Reichsgericht's 102, reversing 1 Zeitschrift fuer des gesammte Luftrecht, 220.)
In another case arising at about the same time the same court said:
"That air traffic is inseparably connected with special dangers was well
known in 1925. They were considered greater then than now. It was
these dangers which the passenger would think of when he heard that
he was to assume the risk and waive the liability of the airplane owner.
The thought of a complete waiver of any damage caused by the fault,
perhaps the gross fault, of the owner was more foreign to his thinking.
To cover such a waiver he was entitled to a notice which could not be
misunderstood." (1 Zeitschrift fuer das gesamrnte Luftrecht, 296.)
In view of these decisions of the highest court of Germany the opinion
of the Amtsgericht at Emden in the matter rendered in 1925 though it
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was reversed by the Kreisgericht at Aurich (1 Zeitschrift fiter das
gesammte Luftrecht, 222) has commanded such high respect in Europe
that it has even been translated into French (10 Revue Juridique de la
Locomotion Adrienne 503). An extended extract from this wellreasoned opinion therefore would seem to be in place. The court says:
Though it may be admitted with Bredow-Mueller (Air Law Statute
Annotations to § 19 subsection 2a 1) that the owner of a plane may in
a single case limit his liability since the claim according to § 19 is of a
private nature yet there are against a general exemption clause strong
legal and moral objections, particularly when it comes to circular flights
at a popular bath where a great number of guests daily grant themselves
the pleasure of a flight. The air with its currents contains for its traveler
greater danger than does the railroad track or the highway. The stringent liability created 'by §19 which is unprecedented in legislation has the
purpose of affording to the citizen during the use of aircraft which are
more and more becoming means of transportation all imaginable safety
which the developing technical science can only afford to a limited degree.
This is so at least to the extent of giving him the right to damages to
be mitigated or excluded only through his own fault. It is necessary
for legislation to take this course even as an inducement to technical
improvements in air navigation. The exemption of liability for personal
injury contended for by the defendant therefore is against public policy.
The contention of the defendant that the aircraft liability risk is only
a small part of the possible claim for damages according to §19 is not
well -taken. If the defendant admits liability toward a person who is
not in privity of contract with her she cannot in justice refuse damages
to a passenger for -injuries happening during the operation of the plane.
The contention of the plaintiff is well taken that the greatest possible
protection must be afforded to those who through using aircraft as
passengers essentially contribute toward the support of aErial navigation
and afford it the means of further development. It is exactly the very
fact that afrial navigation is becoming more and more a means of transportation which demonstrates the necessity of making it increasingly
safe through the most stringent enforcement of liability. An exemption
such as defendant contends for emasculates the statute. (44 Eisenbahn
und VerkehrsrechtEntscheidungen,237, 1 Zeitschrift fuer das gesammte
Luftrecht, 55.)
A Czechoslovakian court in a case where the exemption clause was
printed in the French and Czechoslovakian languages and -the plaintiff
knew neither language has said that an earnest and definite contract for
exemption from negligence is necessary and that it is not sufficient that a
one sided and meaningless assertion is made by handing the ticket to
the passenger without calling his attention to the exemption clause.
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(Zivilantsgerichtin Prague, 1927, 2 Zeitschrift fuer das gesamrnte Luftrecht, 56)
Finally the Reichsgericht in another opinion has said that it would
be beyond reason if after the full development of air navigation the general public were dependent on the use of such navigation to allow the
air companies to misuse their monopoly and the situation of the public
to force passengers to waive the protection which the statute gives them.
(46 Eisenbahn und Verkehrsrecht Entscheidungen, und Abhandlungen,
93, affirmed 1 Zeitschrift fuer das gesamrnte Lwftrecht, 296.)
PROFESSOR CARL ZOLLMAN

Carriers: Valuation of: Rate Making
The importance of the question decided in St. Louis and O'FallonRy.
Co., et al v. United States, et a1,1 and United States, et al v. St. Louis and
O'FallonRy. Co., et al, 2 made it one of general interest when the decision
was announced last May. The question involved in brief was this:
How should the value of railroads be determined so that a fair return
might be had on the capital invested? The answer to this question is
one which affects the inhabitants of the United States individually, either
as users of the railroads or as investors.
The "Transportation Act of 1920 "1 provided that the Interstate Commerce Commission should have authority to fix a reasonable uniform
rate for railroads in various districts so that a return of 6 per cent might
be had on the capital invested in property "held for and used in the service of transportation" as a fair return upon such investment. It was
further provided that "if, under the provisions of this section, any carcier receives for any year a net railway operating income in excess of
6 per cent of the value of the railway property held for and used by it
in the service of transportation, one-half of such excess shall be placed
in a reserve fund established and maintained by such carrier and the
remaining one-half shall be.

..

. paid to the Commission for the pur-

pose of establishing and maintaining a general railroad contingent fund."
In other words, the Commission is authorized to set 6 per cent as a
maximum return on the amount of money invested in railroads. Realizing that in some sections of the country the stronger roads would, under
the uniform rates established by the commission, earn more than 6 per
cent on their invested capital; the Transportation Act further provided
that a fund should be established out of the surplus earnings of these
roads to aid the weaker roads of the same district.
'49 U.S.C.A. No. 15a.
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Sup. Ct. Rep. 384.
'73 L.ed. 457.

